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Abstract 
In Beautiful Losers Leonard Cohen states: 'History decrees that there are Losers and Winners. History 
cares nothing for cases, History cares only whose Tum it is!'1 Whose tum to win, that is, and whose tum 
to lose. In the Hegelian system there are winners and losers, masters and slaves; in history's movement 
toward the universal and homogeneous state there are winners and losers as well. Like history, though, 
Hegel does not appear to care for the cases of individuals. Nor does the historical process of colonization 
and cultural confrontation and domination. Colonization, in fact, is remarkably similar to J.M. Coetzee's 
definition of war: compelling a choice on someone who would not otherwise make it.2 In Hegel's thinking 
the universal and homogeneous state is the peak of historical progress and will signal the end of history. 
For Hegel, that state arrived with Napoleon. The universal - every place - and homogeneous - equality for 
every person - state is the desired goal, because it ends the dialectic of the master and slave. 
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the New Colonialism 
In Beautiful Losers Leonard Cohen states: 'History decrees that there are 
Losers and Winners. History cares nothing for cases, History cares only 
whose Tum it is!'1 Whose tum to win, that is, and whose tum to lose. 
In the Hegelian system there are winners and losers, masters and 
slaves; in history's movement toward the universal and homogeneous 
state there are winners and losers as well. Like history, though, Hegel 
does not appear to care for the cases of individuals. Nor does the his-
torical process of colonization and cultural confrontation and domina-
tion. Colonization, in fact, is remarkably similar to J.M. Coetzee's defi-
nition of war: compelling a choice on someone who would not other-
wise make it.2 In Hegel's thinking the universal and homogeneous state 
is the peak of historical progress and will signal the end of history. For 
Hegel, that state arrived with Napoleon. The universal - every place 
- and homogeneous - equality for every person - state is the desired 
goal, because it ends the dialectic of the master and slave. 
The problem with the theory of the universal and homogeneous state, 
aside from George Grant's objections to it/ is that it is refuted by fact: 
the universal and homogeneous state did not arrive with Napoleon, nor 
has it yet. When the theory is examined closely in the light of histori-
cal events we see that we are more accurately speaking of the process 
of colonization: cultural domination by a superior power which wishes 
to extend its realm of influence and increase its wealth. The colonizer 
exerts power; the colonized falls or is beaten into submission. History 
has, until recently, favoured the colonizer, whose tum it has been to 
win; the individual cases of the losers receive little attention. Nonethe-
less, the position of the colonized casts new light on the universal and 
homogeneous state. Frantz Fanon puts it this way: 
The colonized person, who in this respect is like the men in underdeveloped 
countries or the disinherited in all parts of the world, perceives life not as a 
flowering or a development of an essential productiveness, but as a permanent 
struggle against an omnipresent death. This ever-present death is experienced as 
endemic famine, unemployment, a high mortality rate, an inferiority complex and 
the absence of any hope for the future ... • 
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History is on the side of the winner, and since the great age of western 
European imperialism that winner has been for the most part capitalist, 
white, and male, although as Fanon says, '[I]n France, as in England, 
humanism claimed to be universal'.5 Rather than universalizing and 
homogenizing, the colonial situation creates two separate worlds: one 
of masters and one of slaves. Or in other words, the old system is per-
petuated but in terminology which makes it appear new. The so-called 
slaves are the people who are forced into this universalizing and hom-
ogenizing system - the differences which remain are suffocated by 
power and violence, both physical and psychological: 
On the unconscious plane, colonialism therefore did not seek to be considered 
by the native as a gentle, loving mother who protects her child from a hostile 
environment, but rather as a mother who unceasingly restrains her fundamentally 
perverse offspring from managing to commit suicide and from giving free rein 
to its evil instincts. The colonial mother protects her child from itself, from its 
ego, and from its physiology, its biology and its own unhappiness which is its 
very essence. • 
Chinua Achebe's trilogy, Things Fall Apart, Arrow of God, and No 
Longer At Ease, refutes Western standards of literature and Western 
ideology, in this case Hegel's universal and homogeneous state, by 
showing that both constitute aspects of the new colonialism. The dis-
cussion of the literature of a so-called developing nation - Achebe's 
Nigeria - poses special problems and involves the Western reader in 
questions of politics and of critical standards. Achebe has precisely iso-
lated the issue: 'I suggested that the European critic of African litera-
ture must cultivate the habit of humility appropriate to his limited ex-
perience of the African world and purged of the superiority and arro-
gance which history so insidiously makes him heir to.'7 That limited ex-
perience of the African world, which has historically provoked the reac-
tion of superiority and arrogance, causes the Western reader to be 
struck by the strangeness of the world in African literature, a strange-
ness not only on a realistic level but more significantly in the cultural 
world view, or what Achebe calls the metaphysical landscape (p. 50). 
This of course involves the political and ideological considerations 
which are part of that landscape. The roles of the writer and critic are 
extremely complicated by the circumstances of an historical accident: the 
colonization and recent independence of African states. Political and 
ideological questions are particularly complex for the political thinker 
and imaginative writer in an independent African state.8 They are also 
impossible for Chinua Achebe to ignore. 
Achebe is very frank about the purposes of his writing. His anger at 
white imperialist power is implicit in the three novels discussed here 
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which depict the historical process of cultural confrontation and domi-
nation, and explicit in his poetry and essays. He complains about critics 
who lay 'claim to a deeper knowledge and a more reliable appraisal of 
Africa than the educated African writer has shown himself capable of' 
(p. 5). His own role as artist is to educate his people, teach their his-
tory, and awaken cultural nationalism: '1 would be quite satisfied if my 
novels (especially the ones I set in the past) did no more than teach my 
readers that their past - with all its imperfections - was not one night 
of savagery from which the first Europeans acting on God's behalf de-
livered them' (p. 45). It is very easy, however, to move from necessary 
education to propaganda and parochialism thereby failing the universal-
ity test, another political issue which Achebe indicts: 'I should like to 
see the word universal banned altogether from discussions of African lit-
erature until such a time as people cease to use it as a synonym for the 
narrow, self-serving parochialism of Europe ... ' (p. 9). Not surprisingly, 
in Achebe's words we hear an echo of Fanon's earlier statement. 
Achebe interrogates the neutrality of Western and universal critical 
methodology and standards of literature. He also studies the bitter and 
ambiguous experience of colonialism9 and the accelerated change which 
has occurred in African nations, criticizing imperialism primarily for re-
ducing an integrated and functioning community to chaos. The facts of 
history determined that his people would live out this peculiar tragedy 
of colonization, which is very close to the modernist sense of the ab-
surd. He shows that the Africans had to succumb totally to the imper-
ialist power or be destroyed, while the brave like Okonkwo in Things 
Fall Apart destroy themselves; the struggle to retain a system of values 
and an awareness of the past is a precarious enterprise on both the cul-
tural and personal levels. 
Each of Achebe's novels presents a personal and cultural tragedy, but 
not according to the Aristotelian definition. As Bruce F. MacDonald ex-
plains it, the intrusion of the European into the African world made the 
basis of tragedy unworkable: because of the conflicting sets of values 
no transgression against either can be seen clearly as the cause of an 
individual's fall. Rather than catharsis, a cleansing of the emotions 
through the re-establishment of moral order, a vague uneasiness and 
dissatisfaction remain after each novel:10 the time is out of joint for the 
protagonists whose values no longer have authority within their society. 
The fact that Achebe presents both sides of the colonial situation in bal-
anced fashion guarantees a continued tension. He does not choose be-
tween the two sets of values - neither order is adopted as the right one 
-and the potential remains for more tragedies after Okonkwo, Ezeulu, 
and Obi. Achebe proposes an alternative definition which is particularly 
apt in the context of colonialism: real tragedy is one that goes on 
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hopelessly forever, in a corner, in an untidy spot.11 These tragedies 
represent a humanist concern and in the context of the historical con-
frontation and the phenomenon of imperial rule, a nationalist theme 
as well. The novels avoid the charge of propaganda and are highly 
valued according to 'universal' or Western standards. At the same time 
they also fulfil very powerfully Achebe's political purposes: in a sense 
he plays it both ways and wins. 
Things Fall Apart details the first and crucial step in the process of 
cultural disintegration in the traditional Igbo society. The process is be-
gun by the arrival of the white colonizers, who have 'put a knife on the 
things that held us together and we have fallen apart'.12 Achebe shows 
through his protagonist just how the touch of that knife is able to bring 
the whole world tumbling down. Okonkwo is a respected leader among 
his people and oriented to achievement, partly to compensate for his 
father's failure to live up to the clan's standards of material success, 
which required his son to provide for the family, and his own unclean 
death and burial in the Evil Forest. Okonkwo is afraid to be like his 
father Unoka because he does not want to be thought weak or coward-
ly, and does not understand the contribution his father has made to the 
oral culture: 
He was very good on his flute, and his happiest moments were the two or lhree 
moons after the harvest when the village musidans brought down their instru-
ments, hung above the fireplace. Unoka would play with them, his face beaming 
with blessedness and peace. Sometimes another village would ask Unoka's band 
and their dancing egwugwu to come and stay with them and teach them their 
tunes. (p. 2) 
Unoka is a failure in material terms, but not if his stature is measured 
on a scale one might think is Achebe's own - ensuring the survival of 
the culture by recording deeds of past greatness and lessons for con-
tinued living. 
Unoka's failure to achieve material success is partly attributed to his 
bad chi (p. 13). Okonkwo's success is likewise attributed partially to his 
chi, who agreed when Okonkwo said yes very strongly (p. 19). The no-
tion of the personal god points up the ambivalence of this ethical sys-
tem: a man controls his own fate, but only as far as his chi allows and 
agrees. Paralleling this ambivalence are the dan laws, which maintain 
a balance between personal initiative and fate, between individual free-
dom and responsibility to the dan. The collected wisdom of the dan is 
expressed in proverbs which show the flexibility of the system, but the 
existing laws must be inflexibly enforced because the survival of the 
clan depends on them. The laws are both pragmatic and sacred: a crime 
against the law is a sin against the clan, the earth, and the past, and re-
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quires atonement. Okonkwo lives up to his village's reputation (land of 
the brave) and obeys the laws of piety - in Igbo society the fulfilment 
of religious obligations, and respect for parents, homeland, and the 
elders who represent dead ancestors - which in turn sustain the whole 
social order of the tribe. Okonkwo is defined according to his social 
identity; without it, there is no spiritual meaning to his existence. 
The questions that are raised for Okonkwo, the dan, and Achebe 
when Okonkwo's gun explodes and a clansman is killed, requiring 
Okonkwo's exile, are the questions that prompt Okonkwo's first son's 
conversion to the white missionaries' religion. Okonkwo is horrified by 
his son's act, partially for the dishonour it brings on him personally and 
partially for what it represents: he foresees the threat of annihilation for 
the whole clan if the worship of the ancestors is abandoned. This would 
render the universe meaningless and Okonkwo's life unlivable- which 
is, of course, precisely what happens in the course of the novel. 
Okonkwo murders one of the white missionaries' messengers, but the 
clan will not support his act. In a world which will not recognize the 
values it has taught him, Okonkwo is a tragic anachronism. He ends by 
committing an abominable act - suicide - which ensures that like his 
father, he will be buried in the Evil Forest and in all ways outside of 
the values the clan understands. The white commissioner's response is 
to make of Okonkwo's suicide 'a reasonable paragraph' in a projected 
study of the colonial process, The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of the 
Lower Niger (p. 148). 
There is no return to an order of morality at the end of the novel, 
only to an order of power. No solution speaks to reason or justice; the 
question of justice remains unresolved here, as it does in the other 
novels. Neither is there a sense of relief that would accompany a re-
turn to order, nor can a part of Okonkwo's personality be designated 
as the cause of these events:13 the historical fact of white imperialism 
shortcircuits these responses. In the conflict between systems of values 
power wins, and with a winner there must be a loser. Imperialism in 
Things Fall Apart- bringing natives into the modern world, saving their 
souls, exploiting their resources - transformed an integrated, cohesive 
community into anarchy. This is surely the working out of some kind 
of tragedy, but not Aristotle's. Because neither set of values is domi-
nant in Achebe's novel, no act against either is the cause of Okonkwo's 
fall. His betrayal of the clan makes his death doubly ironic, as it comes 
from his attempt to assert moral responsibility where the basis of re-
sponsible action has been destroyed, and from his perception of the 
helplessness in which the forces of history have trapped his people. 
Moral action and insight lead to hopelessness and a pathetic, useless 
end;14 a real tragedy according to Achebe's definition. The clan and the 
35 
hero are destroyed by a shift of power, not by moral tension;15 
Okonkwo's end is absurdly inevitable. 
The action of Arrow of God follows Things Fall Apart, but the uneasy 
co-existence of the white colonial power and the traditional tribal so-
ciety is intensified by Achebe's concentration on the priest and the 
question of religious meaning. Arrow of God is the central novel in 
Achebe's work as it describes the relationship between religion and the 
social order. The loss of spiritual bearings causes the collapse of both 
the individual and the social order. As in Things Fall Apart, there is no 
return to a moral order at the death of the hero, no sense of justice or 
tragic inevitability. Another stronger power takes over and claims con-
verts and yams; the people abandon their customs; Ezeulu is alienated 
from his people and his god. 
The issue is also one of power: Ezeulu comes into conflict with his 
god and his people over power. He is accused of wanting "'to be king, 
priest, diviner, all"' .16 His power is refuted when the son he sends into 
the white man's world to help his clan adjust to the threat of the colon-
izer is lost to him. The world has been turned upside down by the 
white man (p. 16), and Ezeulu's actions have far different results than 
he had anticipated. The clan laws cannot accommodate the change in 
the world for which there are no precedents. Neither is there, hope of 
escape from the white colonizers and a return to normalcy: "'I can tell 
you that there is no escape from the white man. He has come. When 
Suffering knocks at your door and you say there is no seat for him, he 
tells you not to worry because he has brought his own stool. The white 
man is like that"' (p. 84). Ezeulu does not dispute the justice of the 
white man's position, which is of course patently unjust, but tries to 
find a way for himself and his clan to live with it. Eventually he is 
pulled between the old order and the new circumstances of the village 
until his own and his god's credibility is destroyed. At best Ezeulu is 
attempting to force the village back to unquestioning belief in the god 
and the god's priest. At worst he is indulging his own ambition. 
Achebe allows the ambivalence to remain, and does not in the end say 
whether Ezeulu convinces himself or is ordered by Ulu not to eat the 
yams of the moons which passed while he was in the whites' prison. 
He delays the New Yam Feast and threatens the harvest, not only 
breaking the bond between faith and function, but running counter to 
the consensus of his people. The worship of Ulu is abandoned and the 
white missionaries benefit: 'Thereafter any yam harvested in his fields 
was harvested in the name of the son' (p. 230). 
Achebe does not resolve the ambiguities which provide the basis of 
faith and belief. Ezeulu has to find his position in a universe which 
suddenly resists explanation, and he is cruelly disappointed. His col-
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lapse is due to the tension in both maintaining two worlds and attempt-
ing to reconcile their conflicting demands: 'Perhaps it was the constant, 
futile throbbing of these thoughts that finally left a crack in Ezeulu's 
mind. Or perhaps his implacable assailant having stood over him for a 
little while stepped on him as on an insect and crushed him under the 
heel in the dust' (p. 229). Ezeulu is tragic according to the traditional 
faith, and laughable in the eyes of those who have changed their alle-
giance. He is negligible in the eyes of the imperial power which is re-
sponsible for the crisis which destroys him. 
No Longer At Ease, the third novel in the chronology, finishes the ex-
amination of the process of colonization as the Westernized African pro-
tagonist - a 'been-to' - lives out the definition of modern tragedy he 
provides near the beginning of his story: 
' I remember an old man in my village, a Christian convert, who suffered one 
calamity after another. He said life was like a bowl of wormwood which one 
sips a little at a time world without end. He understood the nature of tragedy .... 
Real tragedy is never resolved. It goes on hopelessly forever. Conventional tra-
gedy is too easy. The hero dies and we feel a purging of the emotions. A real 
tragedy takes place in a comer, in an untidy spot...' (pp. 43-4) 
Obi loses his determination to reform his country on his return from 
England as he does not know how or where to start, and he eventually 
succumbs to the system of corruption to which he was so opposed. His 
conflict, similar to Okonkwo's in Things Fall Apart and Ezeulu's in Arrow 
of God, is with his dual cultures and dual value systems; Achebe under-
lines that sense of duality with his quotations from Western poetry. At 
the beginning of Things Fall Apart at least, the individual's first obliga-
tion was not a question: Okonkwo knows his greatest good comes with 
the greatest good of the village. Obi, on the other hand, is not so will-
ing to share the good fortune of his civil service job with his clansmen 
because he is not willing to accept the tribe's claims on him. Nor do his 
clansmen understand how his attempt to be successful in the new life 
puts him in direct conflict with their expectations. Obi's lack of any 
system of value, and of religion - either the ancient beliefs of his an-
cestors which once gave meaning to the empty rituals his clansmen now 
perform, or the Christianity of the convert whose story Achebe does not 
tell - make him vulnerable in both societies. Obi is actually between 
cosmologies, unattached, and at ease in neither. Achebe describes with 
humour and understanding the precarious game of balancing that the 
clansmen must now perform to keep their community of defectors and 
loyalists stable: '"Bless this kola nut so that when we eat it it will be 
good in our body in the name of Jesu Kristi. As it was in the beginning 
it will be at the end. Amen." Everyone replied Amen and cheered old 
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Odogwu on his performance' (p. 55). Obi does not participate in either 
the old or the new dispensation, and accordingly does not belong to the 
community which is struggling to maintain itself. He is eventually left 
to sip wormwood in an untidy spot as he presaged early in the novel. 
Clearly Okonkwo's solution would not be appropriate here, but it is dif-
ficult to see what would be. Death would be a release, but not a tra-
gedy. As in the earlier novels, the protagonist is confronted with two 
orders of morality, neither of which is restored in the end with any 
sense of moral justice. Nor is there hope that Obi's - or Okonkwo's or 
Ezeulu's - tragedy will change the process in which their culture is 
caught. 
The discussion of relative standards of literary excellence is off the 
point in this context, in which the diminishment of all human life is ab-
surd and immoral. The white colonizer shares that diminishment- the 
colonial system was not adequate for him either: 
.. . [Green) loved Africa, but only Africa of a kind: the Africa of Charles, the 
messenger, the Africa of his gardenboy and steward boy. He must have come 
originally with an ideal.... But when he arrived, Africa played him false. Where 
was his beloved bush full of human sacrifice? There was St George horse and 
caparisoned, but where was the dragon? (p. 103) 
In these terms, all literature is political if morally committed. If the 
price of becoming 'universal' and politically neutral is forgetting his 
past and his future, Achebe will not pay: 
Take care 
then, mother's son, lest you become 
a dancer disinherited in mid-dance 
hanging a lame foot in air like the hen 
in a strange unfamiliar compound. Pray 
protect this patrimony to which 
you must return when the song 
is finished and the dancers disperse; 
remember also your children 
for they in their time will want 
a place for their feet when 
they come of age and the dance 
of the future is born 
for them17 
White imperialism forced Nigerian society, and continues to force 
other third world societies, from a so-called primitive culture into the 
modern world. In Achebe's trilogy this is done in the space of three 
generations - an acceleration of history. Achebe demonstrates his belief 
that the movement into the universal and homogeneous state is not a 
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natural historical maturation for Okonkwo and his people, but a tearing 
leap which puts enormous strain on both community and individual. 
He questions the values of the modernity into which his people have 
been thrown: power, force, and violence make winners and losers, while 
issues of morality and justice are not raised. The conflicts and individ-
ual tragedies caused by progress toward the universal and homogene-
ous state are obvious. The problem with that state is that it is defined 
according to white western capitalist definitions. The division into separ-
ate worlds remains: 'we' continue to compel 'them' into the best of our 
world. 'We' remain the colonizers; 'they', the colonized, are denied the 
right of self-determination. 
Achebe's novels show the damage that the imperial power does to its 
own and to the colonized people. As Coetzee puts it: 
[Our alienation from the cycles of nature] is the fault of Empire! Empire has 
created the time of history. Empire has located its existence not in the smooth 
recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons but in the jagged time of rise 
and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe. Empire dooms itself to live in 
history and plot against history. One thought alone preoccupies the submerged 
mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era." 
That compulsion to prolong the era of empire puts enormous pressure 
on the two groups, the powerful and the powerless. And since the cre-
ation by empire of the time of history, we have lived in time as his-
tory, making our own values and meaning while believing in our right 
not to have our freedom limited. But the colonial situation, of course, 
drastically limits the freedom of both parties and forces them to make 
choices which they would not otherwise make: the white Commissioner 
is pathetic in his strictly professional anthropological interest, and Green 
is similarly so looking for dragons - or windmills - to charge. 
Unfortunately the losers in the colonial situation, both colonizers and 
colonized, cannot live 'outside the history that Empire imposes on its 
subjects, even its lost subjects'.19 They must struggle on with the old 
and now meaningless story, locked into a historical process which con-
tinues to be propelled by its own momentum. Whether the power is 
imperialism, sexism, racism, or technology, historical time seems to have 
declared that it is power's turn to win. The individual cases - in 
Achebe's terms imperialists and natives - are all losers. Hegel's uni-
versal and homogeneous state is a variation on the process of colon-
ization that continues to be played out in history. That process ulti-
mately ensures that there are indeed no masters or slaves, simply indi-
viduals whose victimization differs in degree. Colonialism denies human 
rights to human beings whom it has subdued by violence and keeps in 
a state of misery and ignorance by force. The colonizer, by denying the 
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humanity of the colonized, is dehumanized.20 The end of history would 
seem to be tyranny and catastrophe, hardly the utopian 'fact of being 
a recognized citizen of a universal and homogeneous State ... of a classless 
society comprising the whole of humanity' .21 Empire does not allow the 
possibility of 'fresh starts, new chapters, clean pages'.22 
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